



ENISA Digital Forum - May 2024

Security Needs of Mobile as a Bell shape: from 5G Standalone to 4G-2G legacy

Speaker

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Date


May 15th 2024

01

Who are we?

Cyber Defense in Telecom & Mobile Critical
Infrastructure

5G Network: improvement... and Kill Chain



...and Legacy. Lets see in reality what it looks like in a real world engagement.

02

Red-Team story on a 5G 4G 3G 2G mobile operator

Why it's hard to protect both bleeding edge and legacy



Physical

From outside radio site.
Weak locks & alarms usage (!)



5G gNB and legacy 3G, 4G

Compromise Site
Integration, multiple vulnerabilities



Spread to RAN

Lateral movement,
IPsec attack surface



Spread to Core

Segmentation issues,
management (OAM) takeover



Core Compromise

VNFs, NFV Hypervisor hosts, CNF,
Kubernetes and OSS
MANO takeover

MNO Security Coverage

Activities \ Domains	5GC Telco	5GC NFV	2G/3G/4G Core	RAN	Roaming (2G,3G,4G)	IMS	LI	Fixed Infra	IPTV, OSS, BSS, VAS, Web portals, IT infra...
MNO Organisational audit Process and practices review	3	5							
Architecture review HLD, LLD, product documentation	7	11							
Product Vulnerability Research system / binary analysis	3	13							
Pentest Network discovery & propagation	4	17	21						
SoC / Monitoring validation	6	27							
Physical Security				2				7	
Compliance checks, Products configuration review, supply-chain integration verification									

Green: Covered in this audit

Orange: Partly covered in this audit


Light Grey: Not covered in this audit

Dark grey: Not applicable

Red: Not covered in this audit, high-risk.

Number in cell: number of found vulnerabilities

Bell shape of Mobile Networks vulnerabilities





Bleeding edge research: you don't know the stockpile of the attackers (P1 has 65 in VKB 5G)

Many vulnerabilities and attackers to be covered, how fast do you spot a problem?
Are there Unknown domains?

Attacker arbitrage on Telecom & Mobile targets

Start with a story: 5G Black box Penetration Testing: Outside Radio site to Core compromise & Enterprise Subscriber geolocation attack: Commonality?



Conclusion

- Protecting Mobile operator is a **hard job**:
 - **many perimeters** with both
 - **outdated** legacy technologies (VXworks !)
 - and **bleeding edge layered technologies** (Layer 8 Kubernetes to Layer 1 Optical ROADMs + Ethernet FlexE for SPN Transport)
- **Coverage and depth of audit**
- **Automation** of audits & remediation: many perimeters are not scanned nor monitored (SS7, Diameter, ...) -> **DevOps & CI for Mobile Security**
- **Investment vs Attack surface** : investment in **5G**, but a lot of **legacy** is **vulnerable and not going away**
- Leveraging **needs of Enterprise subscribers** to provide security services to their SIEM: eg **Anti-smishing threat management, Agentless Mobile Fleet Attack Surface Management** etc...
- Security is not anymore only cost center → **Revenue Generation ensures good security**

Thank you !

Questions?

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