



# Ransomware

## Threat from ransomware on the telecoms sector

CFCS threat assessment department  
Jens Oggesen

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# The threat is **VERY HIGH**



Any organization is a potential target

## How ransomware works



- Breaching the perimeter
- Automated attacks
- Human-operated attacks (RaaS)
- Data theft and leak

# Conti leak-site

Herr  
Wolfgang Riedl  
Kastanienweg 8  
34311 Naumburg

Anschlussanschrift:  
Kastanienweg 8, 34311 Naumburg

26. November 2019


## Zugangsdaten für das Kundenportal

Guten Tag Herr Riedl,

anbei erhalten Sie Ihre Zugangsdaten für das Kundenportal auf unserer Homepage ([www.netcom-kassel.de](http://www.netcom-kassel.de)).

### Ihre Zugangsdaten für die genannte Anwendung lauten wie folgt:

Benutzerkennung: 615288

Kennwort: 

Bitte beachten Sie, dass das Kennwort aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen geändert werden musste.

Wir hoffen, Ihr Anliegen zufriedenstellend bearbeitet zu haben und wünschen Ihnen eine gute Verbindung!

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihr Kundenservice der Netcom Kassel

Bei Fragen und Anregungen können Sie uns unter folgenden Kontaktdaten erreichen:

Telefon: 0561 / 920 20 20 (montags bis freitags in der Zeit von 8 - 20 Uhr, samstags in der Zeit von 10 - 15 Uhr)

Fax: 0561 / 920 20 30

Internet: <http://www.netcom-kassel.de>

E-Mail: [kundenservice@netcom-kassel.de](mailto:kundenservice@netcom-kassel.de)

Dieses Schreiben wurde maschinell erstellt und ist ohne Unterschrift gültig.

### Supply Chain Threats

**Outsourcing / Sub suppliers**

- IT infrastructure and support
- Cloud
- Tele-infrastructure & Services
- Network operation
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd-line support
- Cleaning
- Sub sub supplier

• Std. SW libraries  
• Source code injects  
• Test Reports

SW download  
SW patching  
SW update (Antivirus)  
SW Vulnerabilities

### Global tele-infrastructure

Mobile networks, ISPs, Autonomous Systems

Roaming HUB

BGP, IXP, SS7, Diameter

OCH, TAP

Small Cell, WiFi calling, Untrusted

### Production network

Mobile infrastructure: Small Cell Gateway, GGSN / P-GW, ePDG, NB-IoT

Fixed broadband infrastructure: SDN NFV, CGNAT, SD-WAN, Dedicated Internet Access, DSLAM

POLITI Lawful Intercept, DNS SERVER

Call Data Records, Tower dumps, Traffic routing, Customer Communications, Meta Data

Speech & Data: Mobile & Fixed, Air, fibre, coax, copper

Field Service, IoT

### Management network

Network Operation Center, Provisioning, CPE Auto Config. Server, VPN, Rouge WiFi, CALL CENTRE

### Office net

Linux, DNS SERVER, Firewall, Webserver, Email, VPN, CONFIDENTIAL, COPYRIGHT

### Business support & billing

STATS, PERSONAL DATA

cloud(s) Office365, Telecom cloud

### Customers Private & Business

Customer Premises Equipment

End points

WWW

DNS SERVER

Internal/external Client

- ▽ Recursive
- ▽ Root
- ▽ TL Domain (.dk)
- ▽ Authoritative



GlobalConnect ramt af ransomware-angreb: Har spredt sig til flere af selskabets kunder

"Spain's fourth largest telecom operator hit by Revil ransomware gang!"  
Spanish telecom giant MasMovil hit by Revil

## Ransomware Attackers Demand Millions from Telecom Argentina

Telefonica, other Spanish firms hit in "ransomware" attack

EDITORS' PICK | Jul 17, 2020, 08:44am EDT | 20.578 views

## Orange, Europe's Fourth-Largest Mobile Operator, Confirms Ransomware Attack

Ecuador's state-run CNT telco hit by RansomEXX ransomware  
By Lawrence Abrams

July 17, 2021 09:53 AM

## Impact on telecoms from ransomware




- Office network down
- No remote access to management network
- No access to tools or data
- Office phones not working
- Customers do not have access to support
- Customers do not have access to self-service portals
- Data theft and leak



Mobile- and fixed internet services are still working

## What makes the telecoms infrastructure robust?



- Logical separated from the internet and office network
- No mail clients and no direct remote access (?)
- Proprietary Linux / Unix based operation system
- Software upload protected by digital signature
- Password required to configure critical infrastructure
- The management network is not that critical
  
- Hackers prefer the low-hanging fruits
- Anything else?





## Risks

- Poor separation between office network and management network
- Windows OS in telecoms infrastructure
- Ransomware targeting Linux / Unix (non-Windows OS)
- Mail-clients in the management network
- Remote connections to telecoms infrastructure (management and support)
  
- Virtualized telecom infrastructure running on COTS servers
- Ransomware targeting hypervisors
- Outsourcing (IT-hosting, Cloud, Support, Managed service)
- 5G native cloud core
- Open RAN
- Supply chain attacks
- Digital concentration

A recently-concluded investigation into a ransomware attack revealed that the attackers executed a custom Python script on the target's virtual machine hypervisor to encrypt all the virtual disks, taking the organization's VMs offline.

**New Kubernetes malware backdoors clusters via Windows containers**

# Questions or remarks?

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