



Advanced artefact analysis Advanced dynamic analysis

TOOLSET, DOCUMENT FOR STUDENTS

OCTOBER 2015





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Table of Contents

1.	Training introduction	5
2.	Introduction to OllyDbg	6
2.1	OllyDbg interface	6
2.2	Basic debugging and code navigation	14
2.3	Breakpoints	20
2.4	Execution flow manipulation	26
2.5	Plugins 28	
2.6	Shortcuts	29
3.	Unpacking artifacts	31
3.1	Unpacking UPX packed sample	31
3.2	Unpacking UPX with ESP trick	40
3.3	Unpacking Dyre sample	44
4.	Anti-debugging techniques	54
4.1	Anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques	54
4.2	Dyre - basic patching with OllyDbg	55
5.	Process creation and injection	59
5.1	Following child processes of Tinba loader	59
	5.1.1 First stage	59
!	5.1.2 Second stage	68
6.	Introduction to scripting	74
6.1	Decoding hidden strings in Tinba	74



Main Objective	The aim of this training is to present methods and techniques of dynamic artefact analysis with the use of OllyDbg³ debugger package. Trainees will be following a code execution and unpack artefacts using the most efficient methods. In addition they will be tracing a malicious code execution. During the process trainees will learn how to counter the anti-analysis techniques implemented by malware authors. In the second part the trainees will study various code injection techniques and how to debug hollowed processes. At the end of the training they will be presented how to automate the debugging process. The training is performed using the Microsoft Windows operating system.
Targeted Audience	CSIRT staff involved with the technical analysis of incidents, especially those dealing with the sample examination and malware analysis. Prior knowledge of assembly language and operating systems internals is highly recommended.
Total Duration	8-10 hours

³ OllyDbg http://www.ollydbg.de/ (last accessed 11.09.2015)



1. Training introduction

In this training you will learn practical elements of advanced dynamic analysis and debugging of malicious code.


Except the introductory part, the samples used in this training are live malware samples. Consequently all analyses should be done in dedicated and isolated environments. After each analysis a clean virtual machine snapshot should be restored if not instructed otherwise. An Internet connection is not needed to complete this training.




2. Introduction to OllyDbg

2.1 OllyDbg interface

First open OllyDbg debugger. Make sure to run it as Administrator.




If you are using a Windows virtual machine prepared the same way as in the *Building artefact handling and analysis environment*⁴ training then you can also access OllyDbg using the context menu.




Now you should see the OllyDbg interface.

⁴Building artefact handling and analysis environmenthttps://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/training/training-resources/technical-operational#building (last accessed 11.09.2015)






There are two ways to start a debugging process. Firstly, you can attach to the already running process. To do this, choose *File->Attach* and then choose the process of your interest. After attaching to the running process, OllyDbg should automatically break at the ntdll.DbgBreakPoint function.



The second way is to open an executable file using standard *File->Open* menu. This way OllyDbg will create a new child process with a debugged application (debuggee) and stop at the entry point of the executable (by default).

For example, open the putty.exe binary in OllyDbg. After a while OllyDbg should finish its initial analysis.





The Central part of OllyDbg is the CPU window.

Disassembly view (4) presents a listing with the disassembled code.

```
### PUSH ESI

CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetVersion]

MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+10]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8]

MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+6]

MOV ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+6]
00454AEF
                                         56
FF15 E0D24500
8B4E 10
890D 40E14700
8B46 04
A3 4CE14700
 00454AF
 00454AF9
00454AFF
00454B02
00454B07
00454B0A
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            kernel32.BaseThreadInitThunk
                                         8B56 08
8915 50E14700
8B76 0C
```

Registers view (5) presents the current state of CPU registers (for the currently selected thread).




Information panel (6) is used to present additional information about the instruction selected in disassembly view (e.g. operation result, registers values).

```
EDI=00000000
EAX=77381162 (kernel32.BaseThreadInitThunk)
```

Memory dump (7) presents a dump of the chosen memory region.

Address	Hex d	amp														ASCII
0047A000	00 00	00	00	9E		45		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0047A010									A3					00		=7E.‡ōE.ÇūE
0047A020				73					00					00	00	s8E
0047A030															00	
0047A040	08 A7	47	00	68	A7	47	00	68					Α6			⊡ 9G.h9G.h9G.†9G.
0047A050	08 A8	47	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	⊡ ¿G
0047A060	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0047A070	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

Besides the hexadecimal, you can choose other data representation formats by right-clicking on the memory dump panel and choosing required data representation from the context menu.




Take some time to check other data representations. At the end, restore the default format: Hex->Hex/ASCII (16 bytes).

Finally, stack panel (8) presents the stack state of the currently selected thread.






Besides the CPU window, OllyDbg offers few other windows used for different purposes. All windows can be accessed with windows buttons on the toolbar or *View* menu.




The more frequently used windows are: Executable modules, Memory map, Threads, Handles, Call stack, Breakpoints.

The *Executable modules* window presents all executable modules loaded in the address space of the debugged process. Usually, this would be a module of the executed binary and modules of loaded DLL libraries. You can double-click on any of the modules to immediately jump to this module in the disassembly view. You can also right-click on any of the modules to access context menu with additional operations.






For example, right-click on *msvcrt* and choose *View names* to be presented with a list of all names defined in the *msvcrt* library (imports and exports).




Memory map window presents the memory structure with all allocated memory regions in the address space of the debugged process.




For example sometimes it is useful to open an additional dump window with a dump of the given memory region. To do this double-click on the memory region or select it and choose *Dump* option from the context menu.






Another operation you might try is searching all memory regions for a particular string or byte pattern. Let's say you know that somewhere in the memory the string 'wrong passphrase' is present, but you don't know the exact address nor in which memory region is it located.

To solve this problem, right-click anywhere in the memory map and choose *Search* (Ctrl+B) from the context menu. In the new window, type 'wrong passphrase' and click Ok.




If the string is found OllyDbg will open a new Dump window with the position set on the string.




To keep searching for other occurrences of this string in this memory region click on *Dump* window (to make it active) and keep pressing Ctrl+L.






To continue searching for the string in other memory regions go back to *Memory map* window (make it active) and keep pressing Ctrl+L.

Threads window shows all threads of the current process.



Handles window shows all windows opened by the process handles with an additional information regarding the handle type, value and name. This window may be useful if for example you see that some API call is referring to a certain handle and you don't remember what this handle is.




Finally call stack window shows all function calls made up to the current instruction in the current thread.




One of the useful OllyDbg features is highlighting elements that have changed.



Open the *Executable modules* window. If there are any red coloured elements in the window, right-click it and choose *Actualize*.




Next, right-click anywhere in the window and choose *Insert module* from the context menu (this operation is available only with Olly Advanced plugin).



In the *Open* dialog, choose c:\Windows\System32\wininet.dll.


Now all the newly loaded modules should be marked with red font in the Executable modules window.



2.2 Basic debugging and code navigation


Start by loading the **putty.exe** sample as described in the previous exercise.

The current state of the debugged process can be read in the upper left corner of the OllyDbg window.



When the process is paused, the current position (the instruction pointer) is indicated by a black square in the disassembly view and by the value of EIP register.





Whenever you get lost, double-click on the EIP register value to be instantaneously moved to the current position in the code. Remember that if the program has multiple threads, the current position will likely be different for each thread.

```
EDX 09454AD0 putty.
EDX 09454AD0 putty.
EDX 7FFD6000
EDP 0012FF94
EDI 00000000 Dutty.
EDI 00000000 Dutty.
EDI 000454AD0 putty.
C 0 ES 0018 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFFF)
```

There are two modes of instruction stepping:

- Step into (F7) executes current instruction and moves program execution to the next instruction. If the current instruction is a function call then the debugger steps into the call and starts stepping over instructions of the called function.
- Step over (F8) behaves the same as Step into except if the current instruction is a function call, the debugger doesn't step into this call.


If you want to let the program run freely choose *Run* (F9). In the result, PuTTY will create its main window and present it to the user. If you want to pause the program execution then press F12 (*Debug->Pause*) while staying in OllyDbg. You can also restart the executable by pressing Ctrl+F2 (*Debug->Restart*).

Other useful debug operations are:


- Run to selection (F4) causes OllyDbg to resume execution until the selected instruction
- Execute till return (Ctrl+F9) executes the program until return from current function
- Execute till user code (Alt+F9) executes program until user code

Debugging actions can be also accessed through the toolbar at the top of OllyDbg.






If you want to quickly pre-view the execution flow of a program (find loops, check which jumps are taken, etc.) you might decide to use the instruction trace or instruction animation functions.



Restart PuTTY sample (*Debug->Reset*) and then choose *Debug -> Animate over* (Ctrl+F8). Observe what happens in the disassembly window.


Close PuTTY and reset the sample. Now choose *Debug->Animate into*. This time instead of stepping over, the animation will step into each function call (including API calls). You can open the *Call stack* (Alt+K) window to observe all called functions in the real time.




Animate into function usually takes some time until the program finishes execution. To stop it, use *Pause* (F12) function.

Next restart the sample again and choose *Debug->Set condition*.






Set the following two conditions.



Now open Run trace window (View->Run trace) and then choose Debug->Trace over.



This would also be indicated at the OllyDbg status bar in the bottom left corner.

Conditional pause: Command is call edi

Now take a look at the Run trace window.





If you would like run trace to be logged to a file you should right-click on *Run trace* window and choose the *Log to file* option from the context menu (before executing *Run trace* function).

First restart the PuTTY sample:

```
        00454AD0
        $ 6A 60
        PUSH 60

        00454AD2
        68 B07A4700
        PUSH putty.00477AB0

        00454AD7
        E8 08210000
        CALL putty.00456BE4

        00454AD1
        BF 94000000
        MOV EDI,94

        00454AE1
        8BC7
        MOV EAX,EDI

        00454AE8
        E8 B8FAFFFF
        CALL putty.004545A0

        00454AEB
        8965 E8
        MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18],ESP

        00454AEB
        8BF4
        MOV ESI,ESP

        00454AEF
        893E
        MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI],EDI

        00454AEF
        56
        PUSH ESI
```


Whenever you see some call or jump instruction you can follow it (without executing) by clicking on this instruction and pressing *<Enter>*.

In this example follow a call to *putty.004545A0*.




Another way of navigating through the code is using the *Go to expression* feature.

Click on disassembly view and press Ctrl+G.




Type eip to be moved to the current location in the code (pointed by EIP register).

If the entered expression is invalid or the destination address doesn't exist in the address space of the debugged process you will see a proper error message.




Start clicking on registers values. If a register points to the existing address in the address space of the current program, there should be the following options: *Follow in Disassembler* and *Follow in Dump*.





If the register does not contain a valid address, these options won't be available. Additionally if a register points to the location on the stack (like in case of ESP register) there will be an option *Follow in Stack*.

You can do the same with values stored on stack.






2.3 Breakpoints

To set a software breakpoint, double-click in the second column next to the instruction or select an instruction and press F2.

Now press F9 (run) and the program should stop execution on this instruction (before executing it).

To remove a breakpoint, repeat the same steps as when setting it.

You can view a list of all software breakpoints in the *Breakpoints* window.




You can also use this window to remove or temporarily disable chosen breakpoints.

Click on disassembly view and use Go to expression (Ctrl+G) to find the address of ShellExecuteA.




Then set breakpoint on the first instruction of ShellExecuteA (the one to which you were moved).



If the PuTTY process was paused, resume execution (F9).

Next in the PuTTY window, click the *About* button and then the *Visit Web Site* button.





Now go back to OllyDbg.




Take a look at the stack view to see arguments passed to *ShellExecuteA*.

Open the call stack window (View->Call stack, Clt+K) to check from where ShellExecuteA function was called.






Go to OllyDbg and restart the PuTTY sample.



Next, step over until the instruction at 0x454AF9. As you can see some dword value is being written to the memory at the address 0x47E140.


```
ECX=00000002
DS:[0047E140]=00000000
```

Right-click on this instruction and from the context menu choose Follow in Dump->Memory address.




Now *Memory Dump* view should be centred on the *0x47E140* address. Select the first 4 bytes (dword) and right-click on them. From the context menu choose *Breakpoint->Hardware*, on access->Dword.





To view all currently set hardware breakpoints, choose Debug->Hardware breakpoints.



After setting up a hardware breakpoint on 0x47E140, resume the program execution (F9).


Hardware breakpoint 1 at putty.0045743E - EIP points to next instruction

Scroll the disassembly view one line up to see the instruction accessing 0x47E140.




You can now remove the hardware breakpoint (it is not automatically removed after the sample reload).






You can set memory breakpoints in a similar manner as hardware breakpoints by selecting some data in *Memory Dump* view and then choosing *Breakpoint->Memory*.




The second way of creating a memory breakpoint is using *Memory map* window.

Restart the PuTTY sample and open *Memory map* window. Then find PuTTY's .resource section, right-click it and from the context menu, choose *Set memory breakpoint on access*. Now if some code tries to access any data in .resource section, the breakpoint would hit.







Next, resume the program (F9). The breakpoint should hit someplace in the system code.



If you check *Call stack* window you will see that the breakpoint was hit after a call to *CreateDialogParamA* from which *FindResourceExA* was called.



To remove a memory breakpoint, go to the *Memory map* window, right-click on the memory region on which the memory breakpoint was set and select *Remove memory breakpoint*.





2.4 Execution flow manipulation

First, restart the PuTTY sample and step over until the first jump instruction.

You can force this jump not to be taken by changing then appropriate flag in the FLAGS register.

```
EIP 00454822 putty.00454822

C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 1 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FFDF000(4000)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
U LastErr ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER (0000007A)
```

JE (jump on equality) is taken whenever the zero flag (Z) is set. To change the zero flag, double-click on the value next to it.

```
EIP 00454B22 putty.00454B22

C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFF)

P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFF)

A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFF)

Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)

Z 0 DS 003B 32bit 7FFDF000(4000)

T 0 GS 0000 NULL

D 0

0 0 LastErr ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER (0000007A)
```

Now the jump won't be made (grey arrow)

```
00454B19 . 8935 44E14700 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[47E144],ESI CMP ECX,2

00454B22 . 774 0C JE SMORT putty.00454B30


00454B24 . 8935 44E14700 OR ESI,8000

00454B2A . 8935 44E14700 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[47E144],ESI SHL EAX,8

00454B33 . 03C2 ADD EAX,EDX


00454B35 . A3 48E14700 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[47E148],EAX
```


You can also change a jump to never be made by overwriting the jump instruction with NOP instructions. To do this, just right-click on the jump instruction and choose *Binary->Fill with NOPs*.






In a similar way as modifying the FLAGS register you can also modify other registers. To do this, right-click on the register value and choose *Modify*.







Values on the stack can be modified as well.




This time however there are two options: *Modify* and *Edit*.








Besides modifying registers and data in the memory, it is also possible to change instructions that are executed. To achieve this just select the instruction you want to modify and press <space>.




2.5 Plugins

After downloading a plugin, unpack it and copy the plugin's .dll library to the OlyDbg's plugin directory (e.g. c:\tools\Portable version\Olly_110\Plugins). The exact location of the plugins directory can be checked in the Options->Appearance->Directories menu.





After plugin installation, restart OllyDbg. If the plugin is working, it should be available through the plugins menu.



Note that plugins created for OllyDbg v1.10 are not compatible with OllyDbg 2.xx and vice versa.

There are many useful plugins for OllyDbg and it is mostly up to your preference which to use. Among the plugins used in this training are.

- aadp4olly tries to hide OllyDbg from most of the popular anti-debugger techniques.
- Olly Advanced fixes some bugs in OllyDbg v1.10 and introduces new functions enhancing OllyDbg capabilities. It also implements various anti-anti-debugging techniques.
- **ODbgScript** introduces scripting assembly-like language allowing to automate certain tasks.
- **OllyDumpEx** memory and PE dumping plugin. It allows to dump PE image from the memory to the file. Frequently used for dumping unpacked binaries.
- **Bookmarks** allows to insert bookmarks in the code to help quickly navigate to them later.

2.6 **Shortcuts**

Shortcuts are essential parts of OllyDbg. Thanks to the shortcuts you can perform many operations much faster, saving valuable time. This section lists the most commonly used shortcuts in OllyDbg.

Debugging:

OPERATION	SHORTCUT
Run	F9
Pause	F12
Restart debugged app	Ctrl+F2
Close debugged app	Alt+F2
Step into	F7
Step over	F8
Execute till return	Ctrl+F9
Execute till user code	Alt+F9



Pass exception to the program	Shift+F7/F8/F9
Animate into	Ctrl+F7
Animate over	Ctrl+F8
Trace into	Ctrl+F11
Trace over	Ctrl+F12

Windows and views:

OPERATION	SHORTCUT
CPU window	Alt+C
Memory map	Alt+M
Executable modules	Alt+E
Call stack	Alt+K
Breakpoints	Alt+B

Other operations:

OPERATION	SHORTCUT
Follow jump/call	Enter
Assembly instruction	Space
Edit memory	Ctrl+E
Add comment	; (semicolon)
Add label	: (colon)
Insert bookmark X	Alt+Shift+09
Go to bookmark X	Alt+09




3. Unpacking artifacts

3.1 Unpacking UPX packed sample

PEiD⁵ is used to identify if the sample was packed and what packer was used.

In this case, PEiD reveals that putty_upx.exe sample was packed with UPX as seen in the following screenshot.




To confirm the output of PEiD and to identify packing more specifically, CFF Explorer⁶ is used.


⁵ PeiD http://www.aldeid.com/wiki/PEiD (last accessed 11.09.2015)

⁶ CFF Explorer suite http://www.ntcore.com/exsuite.php (last accessed 11.09.2015)





Now, when you know that the sample was packed with UPX let's move forward towards the manual unpacking. To do this, the sample is opened in OllyDbg. OllyDbg should report that the sample looks like compressed or packed code and ask whether to continue with automatic analysis of this code. Answer "No".




Execution of the executable should be paused at the entry point of putty_upx.exe (0x48CD50) which is located in the UPX1 section.




```
CPU - main thread, module putty_up
0048CD50
                    BE 00D04400
8DBE 0040FBFF
                                                      MOV ESI,<mark>putty_up.0044D000</mark>
LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+FFFB4000]
                    57
EB 0B
                                                            H EDÍ
SHORT putty_up.0048CD6A
                     90
                                                             AL, BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
ESI
BYTE PTR DS:[EDI],AL
                     8Ã06
                                                      MOV BYTE PIN
INC EDI
ADD EBX, EBX
SHORT PIN
                    8807
47
                    47
01DB
75 07
8B1E
83EE
                                                      MOV EBX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
                                                             ESI,-4
EBX,EBX
SHORT pu
                    83EE FC
11DB
72 ED
88 01000000
01DB
                                                                      putty_up.0048CD60
                                                      MOV EAX,1
ADD EBX,EBX
```

In order to reach the beginning of an unpacking routine, step over the function (Shortcut key F8) five times until the MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] instruction (at the address Ox48CD6A).




Take a look at ESI (source) and EDI (destination) registries. ESI points to the beginning of the UPX1 section while EDI points to the beginning of UPX0 (refer to previously checked Virtual Addresses in CFF Explorer).

To see packed code follow in the hex dump (Ctrl+G) ESI register.




Then follow in the hex dump EDI register to see a clean memory where unpacked code will be stored.






Then press and hold for a few seconds the Step Over key (F8).



Now scroll down over numerous jump instructions until you see three CALL instructions (at the addresses *0x48CE8A*, *0x48CE8A*, *0x48CEB9*). Set breakpoints at those instructions to inspect what functions are called there. Resume execution (F9).



Put breakpoint at Ox48CEBF (outside IAT reconstruction loop) and press F9 a few times (5-10).


0012FF64 0012FF68		kernel32.75A10000 ASCII "SetEnvironmentVariableA"
0012FF6C 0012FF70 0012FF74	00000000 00000000 0012FF94	
00100070	00125500	
0012FF64	75A10000	kernel32.75A10000 ASCII "SetEndOfFile"




Follow EBX register in hex dump.

0048CEA7 55 0048CEA8 FF96 7CDD0800 0048CEAE 09C0	PUSH EBP CALL DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8DD7C] OR EAX,EAX	kernel32.GetProcAddress
0048CEB0 V 74 07	JE SHORT putty_up.0048CEB9	# exit if unresolved
0048CEB2 8903	MOV DWORD PTR DS: [EBX], EAX	
0048CEB4 83C3 04	ADD EBX,4	
0048CEB7 ^ EB D8	JMP SHORT putty_up.0048CE91	# resolve next function
0048CEB9 FF96 8CDD0800	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8DD8C]	kernel32.ExitProcess
0048CEBF 8BAE 80DD0800	MOV EBP,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8DD80]	kernel32.VirtualProtect
0048CEC5 8DBE 00F0FFFF	LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI-1000]	

Now remove all the breakpoints except the breakpoint outside the IAT reconstruction loop (*0x48CEBF*) and resume execution (F9) to let the IAT reconstruction finish.



Right-click the hex dump and from the context menu choose $Long \rightarrow Address$.





Address	Value	Comment
00461FF0	00000000	
00461FF4		
00461FF8	00000000	
00461FFC		
00462000	7598BED4	ADVAPI32.RegCloseKey
00462004	7598BC25	ADVAPI32.RegQueryValueExA
00462008	7597D2ED	ADVAPI32.RegOpenKeyA
		ADVAPI32.GetUserNameA
	7598B633	ADVAPI32.EqualSid
	7598BA61	
	7598B80C	
		ADVAPI32.SetSecurityDescriptorDacl
00462020	7597FC07	ADVAPI32.SetSecurityDescriptorOwner
00462024	7598BB1D	ADVAPI32.InitializeSecurityDescriptor
		ADVAPI32.AllocateAndInitializeSid
0046202C	7597D3C1	ADVAPI32.RegCreateKeyA
00462030	75981896	ADVAPI32.RegSetValueExA
00462034	759H0499	ADVAPI32.RegDeleteKeyA
00462038	7597D2BH	ADVAPI32.RegEnumKeyA
0046203C	7598194E	ADVAPI32.RegDeleteValueA
	75981B71	ADVAPI32.RegCreateKeyExA
00462044		COMPTION LET. F. D.
		COMCTL32.LBItemFromPt
0046204C	73E1F559	COMCTL32.DrawInsert
00462050	73064619	COMCTL32.InitCommonControls
A STALLA	/5E1EGI1E1	TOTAL SA MAKAMAMI TAT
4		

Next scroll down the assembly code until the characteristical JMP instruction at *0x48CEFC*. Put a breakpoint at this instruction and resume the execution (F9).


After reaching the breakpoint at the JMP instruction do a single step (F7/F8) to land at the OEP. In this case you can recognize the OEP by calls to functions such as *GetVersionExA* or *GetModuleHandleA*. Remember the address of the OEP (*0x459FE0*) because it will be needed later.

```
60
E0DA4700
                                                                                                                   PUSH 60
PUSH putty_up.0047DAE0
CALL putty_up.0045C0F4
MOV EDI,94
MOV EAX,EDI
                                          68 E0DD4700
E8 08210000
BF 9400000
BF 9400000
BF 9400000
BSC7
E8 D8F9FFF
8965 E8
8BF4
893E
56
FF15 E0224600
8B4E 10
890D B8424800
8B46 04
A3 C4424800
8B56 08
8915 C8424800
8B76 0C
81E6 FF7F0000
8935 BC424800
83F9 02
74 0C
81CE 00800000
8935 BC424800
6052
A3 C0424800
                                                                                                                  MOV EAX, EDI
CALL putty up.004599D0
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18], ESP
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI], EDI
PUSH ESI
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[4622E0]
MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[51+10]
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4842B3], ECX
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[4842B4], EAX
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[51+8]
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4842C4], EAX
MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[651+8]
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[651+8]
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[651+6]
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[651+6]
AND ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[651+6]
AND ESI, PFFF
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4842B6], ESI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  kernel32.GetVersionExA
0045A006
0045A009
0045A00F
0045H00F
0045A012
0045A017
0045A01A
0045A020
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  putty_up.<ModuleEntryPoint>
                                                                                                                  MOU DWORD PIN DO. ..
CMP ECX.2
LE SHORT putty_up.0045A040
                                                                                                                                 DWORD PTR DS:[4842BC],ESI
0045A032
0045A034
0045A03A
                                                                                                                  JE SHORT putty_up.0045A040
OR ESI,8000
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4842BC],ESI
SHL EAX,8
ADD EAX,EDX
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4842C0],EAX
XOR ESI,ESI
PUSH ESI
 0045A040
0045A043
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  putty_up.<ModuleEntryPoint>
 0045A045
0045A04A
                                            A3 C0424800
33F6
56
 0045A040
0045A04D
0045A053
                                                                                                                   MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[4622D8]
CALL EDI
                                                              D8224600
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  kernel32.GetModuleHandleA
```




In the next step you will dump the unpacked process image to the executable file. To achieve this you will use the OllyDumpEx plugin which allows to dump a process image from the memory to the executable file in PE format.

When dumping unpacked putty.exe code use the default OllyDumpEx settings. Save dumped process as dump.exe. Don't close OllyDbg yet.




Now if you would try to execute *dump.exe* you will see an *Application Error*. That's because *dump.exe* still doesn't have the IAT reconstructed.






To reconstruct IAT you will use the ImpREC⁷ tool. Run ImpREC (as Administrator) and from the scroll down menu at the top of the window choose the putty_upx.exe process.



⁷ImpREC http://www.woodmann.com/collaborative/tools/index.php/ImpREC (last accessed 10.10.2015)




Next in the "IAT Infos needed" panel enter the RVA address of the OEP (OEP address minus Image Base address, in this case 0x459FE0-0x400000=0x59FE0) and click "IAT AutoSearch". If the IAT is found you should see the appropriate message box. Otherwise you might need to try and manually enter RVA and Size of the IAT.



Next click "Get Imports".






Click "Show Invalid" to see if there are any invalid functions. In this case there shouldn't be any. Click "Fix Dump" and select dump.exe file. If everything goes right you should see a message that dump_.exe was saved successfully (please note underscore in the name of the file name, the originale file wasn't overwritten).

You can try to run *dump_.exe* to check if it runs.


3.2 Unpacking UPX with ESP trick

Open putty_upx.exe in OllyDbg.







Step over *PUSHAD* instruction (Shortcut key F8). Notice how the stack view and ESP register changes, as seen on the following screenshot.




Follow the ESP register in the hex dump and put a hardware breakpoint (on access) on the memory region pointed to by this register.









Next resume the execution (F9) and you should immediately land just before the jump to the OEP.



Remove the hardware breakpoint (Debug -> Hardware breakpoints, Delete).







Now put a breakpoint on the JMP instruction (*0x48CEFC*), and resume the execution (F9) until you reach it. Step over the JMP instruction (F8) and you should land at the OEP.



3.3 Unpacking Dyre sample

In this exercise the unpacking of the Dyre⁸ malware will be presented. Dyre is a banking trojan and was packed using a more complex packer than UPX. Since it is a live malware sample, run it only in a controlled virtual environment and after the analysis restore a clean snapshot of the virtual machine. It is also advisable to forbid any network access while working on Dyre.

Open the file called *voiyhabs.exe* in the OllyDbg. You should see the entry point.




Put a breakpoint on ZwAllocateVirtualMemory (as described in the introduction to OllyDbg).



Now open the *Call stack* window (View->Call Stack, Alt+K) and press the resume execution (F9) a few times until you see a call to HeapCreate with flags set to 0x40000.

Address	Stack	Procedure / arguments	Called from	Frame
0012F89C	7C925E0C	? ntdll.ZwAllocateVirtualMemory	ntdll.7C925E07	
0012F97C		? ntdll.RtlCreateHeap	kernel32.7C812C89	
0012F9A0		? kernel32.HeapCreate	voiyhabs.00401447	0012F99C
0012F9A4		Flags = 40000		
0012F9A8				
0012F9AC				
0012FF34			volyhabs.00401AE6	0012FF30
0012FF38				
0012FF3C		Arg2 = 00000000		
0012FF40				
0012FF44	0000000A	Arg4 = 0000000A		

Remove the breakpoint from ZwAllocateVirtualMemory and show the calling location of HeapCreate in the voiyhabs module.



⁸Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape

http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dyre-emerging-threat.pdf (last accessed 19.10.2015)



Put a breakpoint on the instruction after the *HeapCreate* call and resume the execution (F9). Write down the address of the newly created heap (returned in EAX register, *0xDE0000* in this example, might be different).

Remove the previously set breakpoint (0x40144D) and scroll down until you see a call to RegisterClassEx function (0x4018DE). Put a breakpoint on this function and resume the execution (F9).

```
7C 100000 MOV E
8000000 MOV E
84000000 MOV E
84000000 MOV E
004018BC
004018BD
                                                                                                                                            pWndClassEx = 0012FA08
 304018C5
                                                                                                                           ,EBX
                                                                                                                                            ASCII "MY_EXCLUSIVE_CLASS"
                                                                                                                           .<mark>volyt</mark>
.EBX
                                                                                                                                             lParam = b

DDlgProc = NULL

Owner = NULL

** = 388
                                                                              EBX
                                                                              EBX
                                                                                                                                              Owner = 3E8
Template = 3E8
Inst = 02100210
reateDialogParamA
state = SW_SHOW
                             68 E8030000
FF7424 48
FF15 <u>58714000</u>
6A 05
50
FF15 <u>84714000</u>
004018E7
004018EC
004018F0
                                                                              DWORD PIR SS:[ESP+48]
DWORD PIR DS:[<&USER32.Crea
                                                                                                                                                           0012FA08
                                                                                                                                            hWnd
                                                                              DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.Show
```


Next you will check the address of the window procedure in a registered window class. Hiding some code in a window procedure is a common technique used by a malware to hinder analysis and change the execution flow. If the window procedure points to an existing address it is good to put a breakpoint at this address.

The window procedure address is passed in a third field of the *WndClassEx* structure (*IpfnWndProc*) preceded by two INT values. This means that this address is a third DWORD value in the *WndClassEx* structure.

```
typedef struct tagWNDCLASSEX {
        UINT
                   cbSize;
        UINT
                   style;
        WNDPROC
                   lpfnWndProc;
                   cbClsExtra;
        int
                   cbWndExtra;
        int
        HINSTANCE hInstance;
        HICON
                  hIcon;
        HCURSOR
                  hCursor;
        HBRUSH
                  hbrBackground;
        LPCTSTR
                   lpszMenuName;
        LPCTSTR
                   lpszClassName;
        HTCON
                  hIconSm;
        WNDCLASSEX, *PWNDCLASSEX;
```

Address of the WndClassEx structure is put as the first argument onto the stack. Follow it in the dump.





Now read the address of the Window procedure from the hex dump remembering that addresses are written in the little-endian notation. In this case the Window procedure address is *0x02100210*.

Next try to follow this address in the assembly window. If you land in the existing code section, put a breakpoint at this address. To go back to the current location you can follow the EIP register.

Next scroll down until a call to *EnumDisplayMonitors* function. Put a breakpoint on this call and resume the execution (F9) or alternatively select this location and use *Run to selection* (F4).

```
FF7424 18
                53
53
FF15_4C714000
EB 02
33C0
8B8C24 7C050000
             JMP SHORT volyhabs.004019
XOR EAX,EAX
                                       voiyhabs.00404234
 BOOL EnumDisplayMonitors (
      In
           HDC
                              hdc,
                              lprcClip,
      In
           LPCRECT
           MONITORENUMPROC lpfnEnum,
      In
      Ιn
           LPARAM
                              dwData
 );
```

Check the address of the enumeration procedure (*IpfnEnum*) on the stack (the third argument, in this example *0xEDE688*).





Put a breakpoint on the enumeration procedure (in the assembly window go to the address of the enumeration procedure – *IpfnEnum* and toggle a breakpoint on this address). Resume the execution (F9).

00EDE686	0900	OR DWORD PTR DS:[EAX],EAX
00EDE688	B8 E8F91200	MOV EAX,12F9E8
00EDE68D	∨ E9 76140000	JMP 00EDFB08
00EDE692	CC	INT3
00EDE693	CC	INT3

The execution should break inside the enumeration procedure. Step over (F8) two times to follow the jump.

00EDFB06	CC	INT3	
00EDFB07	CC	ĪNTS	
00EDFB08	55	PUSH EBP	
00EDFB09	8BEC	MOV EBP,ESP	
00EDFB0B	83EC 38	SUB ESP.38	
00EDFB0E	8945 F4	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C].EAX	
00EDFB11	E8 42EEFFFF	CALL 00EDE958	
00EDFB16	E8 DDFFFFFF	CALL 00EDFAF8	
00EDFB1B	8945 EC	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14],EAX	
00EDFB1E	8B45 EC	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS: [EBP-14]	

Scroll down and put a breakpoint on the suspicious CALL EAX just before the function return (RETN).

00EDFBDA	FF75 DC	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-24]	
00EDFBDD	FF75 E4	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]	
00EDFBE0	8B45 FC	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS: [EBP-	43
00EDFBE3	FFD0	CALL EAX	
00EDFBE5	8BE5	MOV ESP,EBP	
00EDFBE7	5D	POP EBP	USER32.7E42A762
00EDFBE8	C3	RETN	

Resume the execution (F9). When you hit the breakpoint on *CALL EAX* step into (F7) the call. You should land in another unpacking stub function.

00EE16B8	0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00EE16BA	0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00EE16BC	B8 00000000	MOV EAX,0
00EE16C1	∨ E9 26220000	JMP 00EE38EC
00EE16C6	CC	INT3
00EE16C7	l cc l	INT3

Step over (F8) two times.

00EE38EA	CC	INT3
00EE38EB	CC	INT3
00EE38EC	55	PUSH EBP
00EE38ED	8BEC	MOV EBP,ESP
00EE38EF	83EC 44	SUB ESP,44
00EE38F2	8945 FC	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX
00EE38F5	E8 A2E0FFFF	CALL 00EE199C
00EE38FA	837D FC 00	CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],0

Now scroll down until a group of three calls just before function return. Put a breakpoint on the first call and resume the execution (F9).

```
        00EE3A31
        50
        PUSH EAX

        00EE3A32
        6A 00
        PUSH 0

        00EE3A34
        6A 00
        PUSH 0

        00EE3A36
        E8 11E2FFFF
        CALL 00EE1C4C

        00EE3A3B
        6A 00
        PUSH 0

        00EE3A3B
        E8 DAE1FFFF
        CALL 00EE1C1C

        00EE3A42
        E8 75DCFFFF
        CALL 00EE16BC

        00EE3A47
        8BES
        MOV ESP,EBP

        00EE3A49
        5D
        POP EBP

        00EE3A4A
        C2 1000
        RETN 10

        00EE3A4D
        CC
        INT3
```

After reaching the breakpoint step into the first function call (F7). You will see several PUSH instructions followed by a call instruction.



When you step over (F8) to this call instruction you will see this is a call to *CreateThread* function.

```
## SEC ## SUB ESP, ## SEC ##
```


```
HANDLE WINAPI CreateThread(
   In opt
            LPSECURITY ATTRIBUTES
                                    lpThreadAttributes,
   In_
            SIZE T
                                    dwStackSize,
            LPTHREAD START ROUTINE lpStartAddress,
   In opt
            LPVOID
                                    lpParameter,
   In
            DWORD
                                    dwCreationFlags,
   Out opt LPDWORD
                                    lpThreadId
```

Now take a look at the stack. The thread routine is passed as the third argument. In this example it points to *OxEE38AC*.



Put a breakpoint on the thread function (IpStartAddress) and resume the execution (F9).






When a breakpoint at the thread function is hit step over (F8) until a call to ECX. Step into the call (F7).




You should land at the OEP with overwritten code which OllyDbg hasn't analysed properly.




Starting at the OEP address select a group of instructions. Next right-click on them and from the context menu choose 'Analysis->During next analysis, treat selection as->Command'.






Now click on them once again and from the context menu choose 'Analysis->Analyse code'.









Next you will dump the process image and reconstruct the IAT table. To dump the process use OllyDumpEx plugin (as described previously).





Now try to reconstruct the Import Address Table (RVA of the OEP: 0x3850) by using ImpRec. This time you might see some invalid imports after clicking *Get Imports* and *Show Invalid*. Right-click on each of them and from the context menu choose *Cut thunks(s)*. After all invalid pointers are resolved, use *Fix dump* to fix the dumped executable.








4. Anti-debugging techniques

4.1 Anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques

One of the countermeasures for anti-debugging is to use special plugins for OllyDbg like $aadp4olly^9$ and Olly $Advanced^{10}$.

When using those plugins you need to check which anti-anti-debugging techniques should be used. You can do this by accessing the plugin's options dialog via *Plugins* menu.



The screenshot below presents the anti-anti-debugging options of aadp4olly plugin.

⁹aadp4olly https://tuts4you.com/download.php?view.3021 (last accessed 11.09.2015)

¹⁰Olly Advanced https://tuts4you.com/download.php?view.75 (last accessed 11.09.2015)




Anti-Anti-Debugger Plugin v0.2 for Ollydbg			
Anti-Anti-Debugger Plugin v0.2 for Ollydbg Anti-Debugging tricks ✓ IsDebuggerPresent ✓ NtGlobalFlags ✓ HeapFlags ✓ GetTickCount ✓ OutputDebugString (format string) ✓ ZwQueryInformationProcess	TerminateProcess ZwOpenProcess FindWindow		
✓ ZwSetInformationThread ☐ BlockInput ☐ SuspendThread ✓ UnhandledExceptionFilter ☐ Process32Next ☐ Module32Next ☐ Truckers Sustant Information			
ZwQuerySystemInformation ZwQueryObject Coded by +NCR/CRC! [ReVeRsEr] Sa	ve Cancel		


4.2 Dyre - basic patching with OllyDbg

If your virtual machine has only one CPU configured you can start Process Explorer/Process Monitor and try to execute the unpacked Dyre sample. You will observe that the sample quits almost immediately and nothing much seems to be happening. The screenshot below shows the Process Tree view as created by Process Monitor tool (*Tools->Process tree*).





Now open the unpacked Dyre in OllyDbg.



If you step over (F8) a few times you will notice that at the first jump instruction (JB) the program is jumping to the ExitProcess routine.







If the value is less than two it terminates the process.

```
002E385B | . 64:A1 30000000 | MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[30]

002E3861 | . 850B | TEST EBX,EBX

002E3863 | . 894424 0C | MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C],EAX


002E3867 | . 58 | POP EAX

002E3868 | . 884424 08 | MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+8]


002E3860 | . 8378 64 02 | CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+64],2

002E3870 | . V 0F82 ED000000 | UB unpacked.002E3963
```

To patch this behaviour click on *CMP* instruction and press space (or select *Assemble* from context menu). Replace value '2' with '1'.




Select modified commands and from the context menu choose *Copy to executable -> All modifications* and then *Copy All* in the dialog window.




In the new window from the context menu choose Save file and save the patched executable.





Now try running the patched executable while observing its behaviour in Process Explorer or Process Monitor (process tree).




If everything is done correctly you should see that the Dyre process is creating a new child process which uses significantly more time.




5. Process creation and injection

5.1 Following child processes of Tinba loader




5.1.1 First stage

First open OllyDbg and load the malware sample "doc o likwidacji _ doc_TK2015.exe". Ignore the error about bad format of the executable.



Now you should land in the entry point at 0x401300.






Insert breakpoints on the following functions:

- CreateProcessW
- SetThreadContext
- WriteProcessMemory
- ResumeThread

Resume the process execution (F9). After a short while you should land at the *CreateProcessW* breakpoint. As you can see either in the stack window or the call stack window (Alt+K) a new process is created in suspended state (*CREATE_SUSPENDED*) and is created using the original executable image.





Step over (F8) a few times till you go past return and land back in the loader code. You should land on the instruction TEST EAX, EAX.

0045EF1E 8B45 0C	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS: [EBP+C]	doc_o_li.0041006C
0045EF21 50	PUSH EAX	
0045EF22 8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS: [EBP+8]	
0045EF25 50	PUSH EAX	
0045EF26 FF55 C8	CALL DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38]	kernel32.CreateProcessW
0045EF29 85C0	TEST EAX, EAX	
0045EF2B V 0F84 A1030000	JE 0045F2D2	
0045EF31 6A 04	PUSH 4	
0045EF33 68 00100000	PUSH 1000	
0045EF38 68 D0020000	PUSH 2D0	


Scroll down in the assembly code and you should see calls to functions such as *GetThreadContext*, *ReadProcessMemory*, *ZwUnmapViewOfSection*, *VirtualAllocEx*, *WriteProcessMemory*, *SetThreadContext*, *ResumeThread*. This is typical for the process hollowing technique.

Now you could step over the code (F8) and follow how exactly the process hollowing is taking place.

Resume the execution (F9). The execution should break on *WriteProcessMemory*. Take a look at the arguments passed via stack to the *WriteProcessMemory* function.



You see that the loader overrides 17920 bytes at the address 0x400000 of the previously created child process. If you follow in the dump source buffer $(0x2130000^{11})$ you will see typical PE headers with likely some unpacked code.




Resume the execution (F9) two times until you break on *SetThreadContext* function. Write down the address of the context structure put on the stack (*0x420000 - pContex*) and follow it in the dump.

The entry point of the newly created process is stored in its EAX register¹². Its value can be read from the context structure at the address pContext+0xB0¹³. In this case the entry point address is 0x00401000 (remember about little-endian notation). Write down the address of the entry point, it will be needed later.


¹¹ This address might be different.





Resume the execution (F9) until you land at the breakpoint on ResumeThread.

Open Process Hacker and find the suspended child process. Right-click on it and open *Properties* window.




In the *Properties* window switch to *Memory* tab and find a memory block where the entry point is located (0x401000 -> memory block 0x400000). Right-click on it and choose Read/Write Memory option.


¹² EAX value in the context of newly created process, don't mistake it with the EAX value in OllyDbg which is the value of EAX register in the context of currently debugged process.

¹³struct CONTEXT http://www.nirsoft.net/kernel_struct/vista/CONTEXT.html (last accessed 11.09.2015)






In the new window go to the entry point address at offset 0x1000 (addresses are relative to 0x400000).






Write down the first two bytes at this offset (0x64A1) and override them with (0xEBFE). Click Write and close the window.




Now switch back to OllyDbg and step over (F8) till return from ResumeThread function.




Now you can minimize OllyDbg. In the Process Hacker window you can also notice that the child process was resumed and is now using a considerable amount of CPU time. This is the result of the endless loop you created in this process. Note the process identifier (PID) of the child process (in decimal).






Start a new OllyDbg instance and attach it to the child process (File->Attach).



Ignore the error message (the same as previously). You should land somewhere in ntdll.






In the assembly window go to the address *0x401000* (EP). You should see the previously injected *0xEBFE* bytes. Put a breakpoint on this instruction and resume the process (F9).




After you land at the breakpoint select *JMP* instruction and press Ctrl+E to edit it. Replace *EB FE* bytes with the original *64 A1*.





After confirmation OllyDbg will automatically reanalyse the code, changing it significantly.




5.1.2 Second stage

First when still paused at the entry point of the second stage, create a snapshot of the virtual machine (name it 'Tinba – second stage'). In case of anything going wrong you wouldn't need to repeat the entire process.

Next put breakpoints on the following functions:


- CreateProcessInternalW
- GetThreadContext
- SetThreadContext
- WriteProcessMemory
- ResumeThread

Resume the execution (F9). Shortly you should land at the *CreateProcessInternalW* call. Right-click on the assembly code and select '*Analyze this!*' (while using the OllyDbg plugin). Next open the *Call stack* window (*View -> Call stack*, Alt+K).




Continue the execution (F9) till you land at the GetThreadContext breakpoint.






Note the address of the *pContext* structure (in this example it is *0x12FAAC*) and follow it at the dump. Next step over (F8) till return from *GetThreadContext* and read *EXPLORER.exe* entry point from the *pContext+0xB0* address. Alternatively you can just find *explorer.exe* executable on the disk and check its entry point address with some PE editor (e.g. CFF Explorer). In this situation EP is located at the address *0x4AA8DF*.



Resume the execution (F9) till the breakpoint on WriteProcessMemory.




Follow the source buffer in the dump address (in this case 0x411026).




Notice names of functions such as MapViewOfFile and OpenFileMapping.

Select the first two bytes of the source buffer (E8 C2) and press Ctrl+E. Replace them with bytes EB FE.




Next step over WriteProcessMemory function till the user code. You should land at TEST EAX, EAX instruction.






Continue the execution (F9) until *ResumeThread* breakpoint. Now since *0xEBFE* trick was already applied you can safely step over (F8) the *ResumeThread* function.

Minimize OllyDbg window and check in Process Hacker if explorer.exe process was resumed properly.




Next open a new instance of OllyDbg and attach it to the EXPLORER.exe process.






After attaching to *EXPLORER.exe* override *EB EF* bytes at the entry point as described in the previous section (original bytes were *E8 C2*). If you don't remember the address of an entry point you can use *Debug -> Execute till user code* (Alt+K) function.




To reach the payload put a breakpoint on *OpenFileMappingA* and resume the execution (F9).

After reaching the *OpenFileMappingA* breakpoint step over (F8) till the user code or choose *Debug->Execute till user code* (Alt+F9). You should land at the *PUSH EBX* instruction.





To reach the final payload step over (F8) the return instruction (RETN).




Now create a snapshot called 'Tinba'. This snapshot will be used in the later exercises.




6. Introduction to scripting

6.1 Decoding hidden strings in Tinba


This exercise starts where the previous exercise ended. If necessary, restore the snapshot named *Tinba* created when you reached the main Tinba payload.



Step into (F7), the first call instruction




Next step into the seventh call instruction (F7).



Take a look at the first call instruction. Step into this call (F7).

You should land at another call instruction followed by a second call to LoadLibraryA.




If you had scrolled up in disassembly window the code would desynchronize.






Now follow in dump *arg3*.



And step over (F8) a call:

007717B7	E8 42210000	CALL 007738FE	
007717BC	FF93 EE104000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+4010EE]	kernel32.LoadLibraryA
007717C2	50	PUSH EAX	_
007717C3	8D83 EC264000	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+4026EC]	
007717C9	870424	XCHG DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX	
007717CC	50	PUSH EAX	
007717CD	E8 30F9FFFF	CALL 00771102	

Take a look at the memory dump.



To use OllyScript create script.osc file with the following code:

```
var base
var labels

; checking memory base of Tinba payload
gmemi eip, MEMORYBASE
mov base, $RESULT

; allocating memory for results
alloc 1000
mov labels, $RESULT

; printing header information
eval "Memory base: 0x{base}"
log "-----"
log "Searching for encoded strings."
log $RESULT,""
log "------"
```




```
search loop:
   ; searching for byte pattern
   find base, #50874424046A??#
   cmp $RESULT, 0
   je end loop
   mov base, $RESULT
   mov push addr,base+5.
   mov call addr,base+7.
   mov data_addr,base+12.
    ; finding data length
   gopi push addr,1,DATA
   mov len,$RESULT
    ; finding decode routine address
   gci call addr, DESTINATION
   gci $RESULT, DESTINATION
   mov decode addr, $RESULT
    ; executing decode routine
    exec
        pushad
       push {labels}
        push {len}
        push {data addr}
        call {decode addr}
        popad
    ende
   gstr labels
   mov string, $RESULT
   fill labels, len, 0
    ; printing result
    eval "{data addr} ({len} bytes) -> {string}"
    log $RESULT,""
   add base,7
    jmp search_loop
end loop:
   log "----"
   free labels
   pause
```


To use this script first make sure that the EIP register points to the Tinba payload (for example you haven't followed in any API call).

Then open ODbgScript Script Window and Log Window.






Next load script.osc in Script Window by right-clicking it and choosing Load Script->Open.



When the script is loaded press <space> to resume script execution or right-click on script and from the context menu choose *Resume*.



At the same time take a look at Script Log Window where the decoded strings should be printed.



Now that you know all encoded strings you can do typical string analysis to guess some of Tinba's functionality. For example on the strings list you can find strings such as *data_before*, *data_end*, *data_inject*, *data_after* which tell that Tinba is using webinjects technique known from other banking trojans.

Each printed line has the following message format:

```
{address} ({data_length}) -> {decoded_string}
```

Where {address} is an address where decoding instructions were found. This means that you can use printed messages to localize at what part of the code each string was used.

Additionally you could create a more advanced script, which would not only decode strings but also rewrite the Tinba code in such a way that it would reference to already decoded strings instead of decoding them at runtime.



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